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I. INTRODUCTION
O N DECEMBER 21, 2011, the Court of Justice of the Euro-pean Union handed down its judgment in the case of Air
Transport Ass'n of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate
Change (Air Transport).' The Court's far-reaching and controver-
sial decision validated the European Union's (EU) carbon emis-
sions trading scheme (the scheme) as applied to international
aviation. 2 This decision has not been without widespread, out-
spoken criticism, especially from non-EU countries.' This article
explores the Court's decision in this landmark case, analyzes the
decision in light of relevant international law, and concludes
that the Court's judgment was excessive and should have been
more narrowly tailored to conform to jurisdictional customary
international law-namely, the "effects doctrine."
Part II summarizes and gives context to the relevant interna-
tional treaties that laid out part of the framework for the Court's
decision and the applicable EU directives that established the
scheme. Part III comprehensively analyzes and explains the Air
Transport case in its entirety. Part IV briefly observes interna-
tional opposition to the Court's decision and the EU's subse-
quent suspension of the scheme. Part V looks to applicable
customary international law regarding jurisdiction that is rele-
vant to the Air Transport case, and whether the scheme, as inter-
preted in Air Transport, satisfies the effects doctrine as a basis for
jurisdiction. Finally, Part VI offers a brief conclusion. Although
the Court gave considerable attention to the effect of interna-
tional treaties on the directives, this article focuses the majority
of its analysis on the relevant aspects of jurisdictional customary
international law.
II. THE SCHEME'S FRAMEWORK-INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES AND EU DIRECTIVES
A. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
Over the past sixty years, the Member States of the EU and
the EU itself (formerly known as the European Community)
have entered into various international treaties that influence
I Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Sec'y of State for Energy & Cli-
mate Change, 2 C.M.L.R. 4 (2012).
2 Id. 155-157.
3 See, e.g., Valerie Volcovici, Senate Votes to Shield U.S. Airlines from EUs Carbon
Scheme, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/22/
us-usa-carbon-airlines-idUSBRE88LO6C20120922.
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the EU's ability to regulate international aviation and its abil-
ity-even its obligation-to regulate the emission of greenhouse
gases. A few of these treaties include the Chicago Convention,
the Kyoto Protocol, and the Open Skies Agreement.
The Chicago Convention was signed on December 7, 1944,
and established the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), among other things.4 The Convention has been ratified
by each EU Member State, but not by the EU itself.5 Generally
speaking, the Chicago Convention worked to effectuate interna-
tional cooperation with respect to international aviation, liberal-
ized the international aviation market, and established a
uniform framework for the regulation of international aviation.'
The Chicago Convention is considered the "backbone of inter-
national air law."7
On May 9, 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (Framework Convention) was adopted with
"the ultimate objective of achieving stabilisation of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would pre-
vent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate sys-
tem."' Pursuant to the Framework Convention, the Kyoto
Protocol was adopted on December 11, 1997.9 "The purpose of
the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce, during the period 2008 to 2012,
overall emissions of six greenhouse gases . . . to at least 5% be-
low 1990 levels"; EU Member States committed to reducing
their greenhouse gas emissions "to 8% below their 1990
levels.""o The EU itself is a party to both the Framework Conven-
tion and the Kyoto Protocol." Notably, Article 17 of the Kyoto
Protocol specifically endorses the implementation of a carbon
emissions trading scheme.12
4 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
5 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 2 C.M.L.R. 4, 1 3.
6 See Chicago Convention, supra note 4.
7 Benoit Mayer, Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and
Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Judgment of the Court
ofJustice (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2011, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1113, 1127
(2012).




12 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
481
JOURNAL OF AIR LAWAND COMMERCE
Finally, in April 2007, the United States and the EU entered
into an agreement regarding international air transportation
that was "designed in particular to facilitate the expansion of
international air transport opportunities by opening access to
markets and maximising benefits for consumers, airlines, la-
bour, and communities on both sides of the Atlantic."" This
agreement-the Open Skies Agreement-was amended in June
2010.14 The relevant provisions of the Open Skies Agreement
will be discussed in detail in Part III.
B. RELEVANT EU DIRECTIVES
The EU's emissions trading scheme began with Directive
2003/87 and took effect on January 1, 2005.15 This initial emis-
sions trading scheme only applied to a limited number of activi-
ties-it did not apply to aviation activities.' The EU
subsequently enacted Directive 2008/101 to amend Directive
2003/87 and include aviation activities in the scheme.' 7 Direc-
tive 2008/101 took effect on January 1, 2012: "From 1 January
2012 all flights which arrive at or depart from an aerodrome
situated in the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty
applies shall be included."18 In other words, all flights-whether
operated by EU or non-EU airlines-that take off from or land
at an airport within the EU must participate in the scheme."
This is where things start to get controversial.
What exacerbates the international aviation industry's and
non-EU countries' disdain for this unilateral scheme is the
formula used to calculate the amount of carbon emissions for
which each airline is liable. Emissions are calculated from take-
off until landing, regardless of how much flight time was spent
over EU territory; the entire flight's emissions are counted as
long as the flight either took off from or landed in EU terri-
tory.20 For example, a U.S. airline conducting a round-trip flight
from New York to London to New York will be liable for its emis-
13 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 2 C.L.M.R. 4, 1 13.
"4 Id. AG16.
15 Mayer, supra note 7, at 1115.
16 Id. at 1115-16.
17 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 2 C.L.M.R. 4, 1 32.
18 Id. 11 33-34.
19 See id.
20 See id. 40. The specific emissions quantity for which an airline is liable is
calculated by the following formula: "fuel consumption x emission factor." The
value of the "fuel consumption" variable is calculated by the following formula:
"amount of fuel contained in aircraft tanks once fuel uplift for the flight is com-
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sions throughout the entire flight, including its emissions in
U.S. airspace.2 1
III. AIR TRANSPORT-ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OF
JUSTICE'S OPINION
The principal case, Air Transport, was brought by the Air
Transport Association of America and various American airline
companies (collectively, the ATA) against the United Kingdom's
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (the U.K is
the administering Member State)." The ATA brought the case
in the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Queen's
Bench Division, which stayed the proceedings and referred sev-
eral questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.23
Ultimately, the Court had to address two questions: (1) which,
if any, of the possible sources of international law "are capable
of being relied upon . .. for the purpose of assessing the validity
of Directive 2008/101"; and (2) if any of the sources may be
relied upon, whether the Directive was valid in light of such
sources of international law.24 The sources of international law
referred to by the U.K. court and the objects of these two ques-
tions were the Chicago Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, the
Open Skies Agreement, and four "principles" of customary in-
ternational law. 25 The four principles included: (1) the "princi-
ple that each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over
its airspace"; (2) the "principle that no State may validly purport
to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty"; (3) the
"principle of freedom to fly over the high seas"; and (4) the
"principle that aircraft overflying the high seas are subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the State in which they are registered."2 6
The existence of the first three principles was uncontested, but
the existence of the fourth as a valid principle of customary in-
ternational law was disputed.
plete - amount of fuel contained in aircraft tanks once fuel uplift for subsequent
flight is complete + fuel uplift for that subsequent flight." Id.
21 See generally id.
22 Id. 11 42-43.
23 Id. 45.
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A. WHICH SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw MAY BE USED TO
ASSESS THE VALIDITY OF THE DIRECTIVE?
The Court of Justice began its analysis by noting, "[W] here
international agreements are concluded by the European
Union [,] they are binding upon its institutions and, conse-
quently, they prevail over acts of the European Union. "28 Be-
cause only the EU Member States themselves-and not the EU
as a whole-are parties to the Chicago Convention, the Court
held that the EU is not bound by the Convention and it there-
fore cannot affect the validity of Directive 2008/101.29 Likewise,
while the EU is a party to the Kyoto Protocol, the Court found
that the relevant provisions of the Protocol relating to the
scheme are not "unconditional and sufficiently precise" to be
relied upon to assess the validity of Directive 2008/101.30 On the
other hand, the Court did find that certain provisions of the
Open Skies Agreement are unconditional and sufficiently pre-
cise." Therefore, the Court held that the Open Skies Agree-
ment was the only international treaty that could be used to
assess the validity of Directive 2008/101 in this case."
The Court of Justice next determined which of the alleged
"principles" of customary international law were recognized
principles and whether the recognized principles could be used
to assess the validity of Directive 2008/101.33 The Court con-
firmed the recognition of the first three uncontested principles
of customary international law referred to by the U.K. court, but
held that there was insufficient evidence to recognize the fourth
alleged principle as a principle of customary international law.3 4
The Court then determined whether principles of customary
international law can be relied upon to assess the validity of an
EU directive." In finding that they can be, the Court referred to
the Treaty on European Union and stated, "[T]he European
Union is to contribute to the strict observance and the develop-
ment of international law. Consequently, when it adopts an act,
it is bound to observe international law in its entirety, including
customary international law, which is binding upon the institu-
28 Id. 50.
29 Id. 11 69-70.
30 Id. 11 77-78.
si Id. 87, 94, 100.
32 Id. 1 111.
33 Id. 1 102.
34 Id. 105-106.
3 Id. 1 107-111.
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tions of the European Union."" Therefore, a relevant principle
of customary international law is capable of affecting the ability
of the EU to adopt a particular directive. However, because a
principle of customary international law lacks the precision that
is typically found in an international agreement, the Court de-
termined that 'judicial review must necessarily be limited to the
question whether, in adopting the act in question, the institu-
tions of the European Union made manifest errors of assess-
ment concerning the conditions for applying those
principles."3 8 In other words, the Court established that while
principles of customary international law may be used to review
the validity of an EU directive, such review is done under a
highly deferential standard of review: "manifest error."3 9
Therefore, the Court's answer to question one (which of the
referred sources of international law may be relied upon to ad-
dress the validity of EU Directive 2008/101) is that the following
sources may be relied upon: (1) the Open Skies Agreement; (2)
the principle that each state has complete and exclusive sover-
eignty over its airspace; (3) the principle that no state may val-
idly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty; and (4) the principle of freedom to fly over the
high seas.40 When reliance is placed on the three principles of
customary international law, review is limited to the standard of
manifest error."1 It is with this determination that the Court
turned to the second question: whether Directive 2008/101 is
valid in light of these applicable sources of international law.
B. Is DIRECTIVE 2008/101 VALID IN LIGHT OF BINDING,
APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAw?
The Court ultimately determined that Directive 2008/101 was
valid because none of the four binding, applicable international
laws relied upon acted so as to cast doubt on the validity of Di-
rective 2008/101 and "disclosed no factor of such kind as to af-
fect its validity."4 2 The Court analyzed the Open Skies
Agreement separately from the three principles of customary in-
ternational law.
36 Id. 1 101.
3 Id. 1 107.
38 Id. 1 110.
3 Id.
40 Id. 111.
41 Id. 1 110.
42 Id. 157.
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In determining that Directive 2008/101 does not violate the
Open Skies Agreement, the Court implicitly emphasized the
great importance of "improving environmental protection."
The Court found that the Open Skies Agreement allows "unilat-
eral non-discriminatory measures in the absence of ICAO stan-
dards."4 4 And while the Open Skies Agreement prohibits a
direct charge on fuel consumption, such as "a tax levied on fuel
consumption itself," the Agreement does not prohibit "market-
based measure [s]," such as the scheme established in the Direc-
tive.4 ' The Court also focused on the Open Skies Agreement's
requirement of reciprocity when establishing regulations related
to environmental protection.4 6 The scheme is non-discrimina-
tory in that it applies evenly to EU and non-EU airlines alike,
and therefore the Court found that the scheme lives up to the
requirement of reciprocity.47
One of the main issues raised by the ATA in Air Transport-an
issue that is the focus of the analysis in Part V-is that the EU is
regulating and subjecting non-EU airlines to its laws under the
scheme for aviation activities occurring beyond the jurisdiction
of the EU.48 The Open Skies Agreement-specific argument is
that this violates Article 7, which "requires aircraft engaged in
international navigation to comply with the laws and regulations
of the European Union only when the aircraft enter or depart
from the territory of the Member States or . . . when their air-
craft are within that territory."" The Court dismissed this argu-
ment by reasoning that "it need only be recalled" that the
scheme does not apply to non-EU aircraft that are solely flying
over the high seas or non-EU Member States, but rather only
applies to non-EU airlines that "choose to operate commercial
air routes" taking off from or landing in the EU; furthermore,
Article 7 makes it clear that aircraft seeking admission into or
departure from EU territory are engaged in international avia-
tion and are "required to comply with" legislation of that terri-
tory, and thus such airlines are not precluded under Article 7.'o
4 See id. 11 138-140, 150.
44 Mayer, supra note 7, at 1122.
45 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 2 C.L.M.R. 4, 11 142, 144, 145, 147.
46 Id. 11 93-94, 137.
47 Id. 11 154-156.
8 See id. 1 131.
49 Id. (emphasis added).
so Id. 11 131-135.
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In determining that Directive 2008/101 does not violate any
of the three binding, applicable principles of customary interna-
tional law, the Court reasoned through the jurisdictional reach
of the scheme. In explaining the permissible "territorial scope"
of EU legislation, the Court stated that the EU "must respect
international law in the exercise of its powers."" However, when
an aircraft is within EU territory-meaning physically within the
territory, such as when an aircraft lands at an airport-it "is sub-
ject to the unlimited jurisdiction" of the EU.52 Accordingly, the
Court rationalized that because non-EU aircraft flying over but
not landing in the EU are not subject to the scheme, and be-
cause planes that are subject to the scheme have actually landed
in the EU, the scheme does not infringe upon the territoriality
or sovereignty of third countries; such planes are subject to the
unlimited jurisdiction of the EU when located at EU airports. 3
According to the Court, this satisfies the principle of freedom to
fly over the high seas because an aircraft is free to fly over the
high seas (and even the EU) without being subject to the
scheme; subjection to the scheme is solely dependent upon ac-
tually landing in the EU. 5 4 And once again, the Court empha-
sized that such aircraft have "chosen to operate a commercial air
route" taking off from or landing in the EU. 5
Such an explanation fails tojustify the scheme subjecting non-
EU aircraft to liability for emissions that actually occurred
outside the jurisdiction of the EU, such as emissions occurring
over the high seas or over the airspace of a third country. The
Court seemed to realize this and attempted to justify this aspect
of the scheme by stressing the importance of environmental pol-
icy to the EU, emphasizing the "high level of protection" the EU
seeks to provide for the environment, and referring to the EU's
desire to fulfill the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol.56 Stretching
its justification for the extraterritorial effects of the scheme even
further, the Court implicitly invoked the "effects doctrine" and
seemed to suggest that emissions occurring outside EU territory
still have an indirect but sufficiently causally linked (territorially
51 Id. 11 121, 123.
52 Id. 124.
53 Id. 1 125.
54 Id. 1 126.
5 Id. 1 127.
56 Id. 1 128.
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linked) effect on the EU's environment by detrimentally affect-
ing climate change worldwide."
Accordingly, the Court's ultimate judgment left the scheme
wholly intact and unblemished by the Open Skies Agreement
and principles of customary international law. Perhaps most
controversially, the Court did not feel that imposing liability on
non-EU aircraft for emissions occurring outside the EU is an
impermissible extraterritorial overreach of EU jurisdiction. 8
IV. INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION AND THE EU'S
SUSPENSION OF THE SCHEME
The scheme has been labeled "[o] ne of the world's most con-
tentious regulations."" Opposition to this ruling and the EU's
passage of Directive 2008/101 emerged when Directive 2008/
101 was still-a mere idea, and the United States seems to have
maintained its position at the forefront of the opposition.o In
2007, before Directive 2008/101 was passed, the United States
led a diplomatic coalition of high-level diplomats from countries
such as China and Canada against the inclusion of non-EU air-
craft in the proposed Directive.6 1 The coalition considered the
inclusion of non-EU aircraft to be an inappropriate "'unilateral
proposal."' 6 2 Furthermore, after the passage of Directive 2008/
101 and during the Court of Justice's deliberation of Air
Transport,
the diplomacies of 28 countries, including Brazil, South Africa,
India and China, denounced what they called EU's "unilateral-
ism," and they led the Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) to declare its opposition to the EU plan.
Threats of retaliation were put forward by Chinese and American
Lobbyists. Five days before the release of the Court's judgment, a
letter by US Secretary of State Clinton . . . reaffirmed that the
United States would be "compelled to take appropriate action" if
the EU followed its plans.6 "
57 See id. 1 129.
58 Id. 157.
59Wolfgang H. Thome, African Airlines Exhale After EU Suspends ETS, E TuRBo
NEws (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.eturbonews.com/32227/african-airlines-ex-
hale-after-eu-suspends-ets.
60 Mayer, supra note 7, at 1113.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1113-14.
63 Id. at 1114 (internal citations omitted). Japan has also declared its opposi-
tion to the scheme and the Air Transport decision. Charles Alcock & Paul Lowe,
Europe Backs Down with International ETS Suspension, AINONLINE (Dec. 3, 2012,
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These threats of retaliation and opposition were not purely
empty threats. In response to Air Transport, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed the European Union Trading Scheme
Prohibition Act," a strongly bipartisan bill that the U.S. Senate
had already unanimously passed and that shielded U.S. airlines
from paying for their carbon emissions.6 5 The bill went into ef-
fect on November 27, 2012, with President Obama's signature.6 6
Interestingly, the sponsors of the two U.S. bills condemned the
scheme as a "tax," an "illegal tax," and "a European tax when
flying in U.S. airspace."67 However, the EU adamantly denies
that the scheme is a tax.61 The bills passed by the U.S. Congress
give "the U.S. transportation secretary authority to stop U.S. air-
lines from complying with the EU law."69 In addition to the
American responses to Air Transport, "the four main Chinese air-
lines announced that they would not pay any carbon charge;
Russia threatened to retaliate in restricting trans-Siberian flights
for European airlines; and the African Airline Association ex-
pressed its hostility to the scheme."7 o China even made threats
to impound European aircraft if the EU attempted to punish
Chinese airlines for not complying with the scheme.7 1 However,
almost all airlines have "reluctantly" complied with the
scheme. But "Chinese and Indian carriers missed an interim
deadline to submit information required under [the
scheme]."
The international outrage surrounding the scheme and Air
Transport only gained steam over time and came to the brink of
an "immediate threat of a trade war with major powers such as
the U.S., China, Russia, India andJapan."74 In light of this inter-
national backlash, the EU's climate change commissioner an-
3:10 AM), http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-
news/2012-12-03/europe-backs-down-international-ets-suspension.
64 European Union Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-
200, 126 Stat. 1477 (2012).
65 Alcock & Lowe, supra note 63; Volcovici, supra note 3.
66 See European Union Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011.
67 Volcovici, supra note 3.
68 Neha Sethi, India to Continue to Oppose EU's Move to Levy Carbon Tax, LIvE
MINT (Mar. 6, 2013, 12:40 AM), http://www.livemint.com/Politics/jSPZOxGBKZ
JTEWamRHiacL/India-to-continue-to-oppose-EUs-move-to-levy-carbon-tax.html.
69 Volcovici, supra note 3.
70 Mayer, supra note 7, at 1114 (internal citations omitted).
7' Volcovici, supra note 3.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Alcock & Lowe, supra note 63.
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nounced that the EU would temporarily suspend the
application of the scheme to flights into and out of EU Member
States on November 12, 2012.7' Because the suspension only ap-
plies to flights into and out of EU Member States, it does not
halt the application of the scheme to intra-EU flights, regardless
of whether the flights are operated by EU or non-EU airlines.76
While the international community welcomed the suspension of
the scheme, the partial suspension upset EU airlines that feel
the suspension now shoulders the administrative costs of the
scheme on EU airlines.
The EU's suspension of the scheme is limited in duration, as
the stated purpose of the suspension is to provide time for the
ICAO General Assembly to negotiate a multilateral international
deal that provides an alternative program to the scheme.78 Ac-
cordingly, the EU committed to suspending the application of
the scheme to flights into and out of EU Member States until
the ICAO General Assembly meets from September 24 to Octo-
ber 4, 2013.7' The EU climate change commissioner warned
that if the ICAO fails to reach an international deal, then the
full scheme will automatically be reinstated. 0
Although the fate of the scheme, as approved by the Court of
Justice in Air Transport, is uncertain, the remainder of this article
focuses on the legitimacy of the scheme and the Air Transport
decision in light of select principles of customary international
law.
V. THE JURISDICTIONAL OVERREACH OF THE COURT
OF JUSTICE
A primary concern generated by the scheme and the Court's




78 Id.; Reducing Emissions from the Aviation Sector, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index-en.htm (last updated Oct. 31,
2013).
79 Alcock & Lowe, supra note 63; Assembly - 38th Session, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION
ORG., http://www.icao.int/Meetings/a38/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 2,
2013).
80 Alcock & Lowe, supra note 63. The likelihood of the ICAO successfully com-
ing up with an "international deal is unclear"; however, the European Commis-
sion on Climate Change is quick to point out that "[t]he EU has been seeking a
global agreement to tackle aviation emissions through the [ICAO] for more than
15 years." Reducing Emissions from the Aviation Sector, supra note 78.
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scheme on non-EU airlines are beyond the jurisdiction of the
EU. This concern is well-founded, as a closer look at the effects
doctrine demonstrates that the scheme and the Court of Jus-
tice's carte blanche approval of Directive 2008/101 violated the
effects doctrine by allowing the EU to impermissibly regulate
extraterritorial activities of non-EU airlines-regulation beyond
the jurisdiction of the EU.
A. JURISDICTION, TERRITORIALITY, AND THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE
A central principle of customary international law is the sover-
eign equality of all nations.8' Accordingly, nations are endowed
with jurisdictional authority within their territory and over their
population. 2 This has given rise to two discrete, independent
bases of jurisdiction in international law: territoriality and na-
tionality." Because the nationality basis of jurisdiction generally
addresses a nation's jurisdiction over its own nationals, national-
ity is not a relevant consideration in the context of Directive
2008/101 and Air Transport." On the other hand, territoriality is
especially relevant to Directive 2008/101.
The traditional concept of territoriality is "by far the most
common basis for the exercise of jurisdiction . . . , and it has
generally been free from controversy. "85 Territoriality, or the
"authority to make and enforce laws within [a nation's] terri-
tory," 6 is coherently codified in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (Restatement) § 402:
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to (1) (a)
conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory; (b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present
within its territory; [and] (c) conduct outside its territory that
has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory."
A controversial development in the territorial principle of ju-
risdiction is the "effects doctrine," a doctrine that was first intro-
81 Deborah Senz & Hilary Charlesworth, Building Blocks: Australia's Response to
Foreign Extraterritorial Legislation, 2 MELB. J. INT'L L. 69, 79 (2001).
82 Id.
83 Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 cmt. b. (1987).
84 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402.
85 Id. § 402 cmt. c.
86 Senz & Charlesworth, supra note 81, at 79.
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1).
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duced in the American landmark case of United States v.
Aluminum Co. ofAmerica and generally permits limited extraterri-
torial jurisdiction in certain circumstances." While " [t]he ef-
fects doctrine has been widely criticized," 9 "the proper limits of
jurisdiction over transnational activity have been analyzed by Eu-
ropean courts and other authorities in much the same way as by
those in the United States."9 0 The effects doctrine is an aspect of
territorial jurisdiction and can generally be defined as "jurisdic-
tion with respect to activity outside the state, but having or in-
tended to have substantial effect within the state's territory."91
The Restatement makes clear that to validly exercise jurisdiction
under the effects doctrine, one must: (1) meet § 402(1) (c)'s re-
quirement of an effect or intended effect that is substantial; and
(2) demonstrate that "the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable
under § 403."92
Restatement § 403 explains that jurisdiction over persons or ac-
tivities having substantial effects or substantial intended effects
cannot be exercised when it would be unreasonable to do so."
When deciding whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be
reasonable, all relevant factors should be considered. The fac-
tors provided by § 403 can be distilled into three general factors:
(1) the territorial/causal link of the activity to the regulating
state; (2) the importance of the regulation to the regulating
state; and (3) comity considerations (other nations' perceptions
of the regulation and conflicts of laws with other nations).9
In summary, to validly assert the effects doctrine as a basis for
jurisdiction, one must fulfill a two-prong test by showing that:(1) the conduct has a substantial effect or intended effect on
the regulating state; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction by the
regulating state is reasonable.
88 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945);
Senz & Charlesworth, supra note 81, at 81.
89 Senz & Charlesworth, supra note 81, at 81-82.
go RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403 reps. note 1.
91 Id. § 402 cmt. d.
92 Id.
93 Id. § 403(1).
94 Id. § 403(2)-(3) (listing the full, nonexclusive list of factors to be
considered).
95 Id. §§ 402-403.
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B. DOES DIRECTIVE 2008/101, AS INTERPRETED IN AIR
TRANSPORT, SATISFY THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE?
In Air Transport, the Court of Justice evaluated Directive
2008/101 in light of the three binding, applicable principles of
customary international law referred to the Court by the U.K
court; importantly, this review was done under a manifest error
standard of review.96 Although all three principles relied upon
in this case involve aspects of jurisdiction, the first "principle [,]
that each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its
airspace," is especially rooted in the customary international law
principle of the sovereign equality of all nations. 7 It is evident
that the Court realized this and implicitly recognized that Direc-
tive 2008/101 involved jurisdictional issues throughout several
parts of its evaluation of customary international law.9 8 There-
fore, in the author's opinion, a more thorough discussion of ju-
risdiction, and in particular the effects doctrine, was warranted
and should have been undertaken by the Court in Air Transport.
At this point, it is helpful to separate the scheme into two dif-
ferent regulations: (1) subjection of non-EU airlines to liability
for emissions that occur within the territorial airspace of the EU
(territorial emissions); and (2) subjection of non-EU airlines to
liability for emissions that occur outside the territorial airspace
of the EU (extraterritorial emissions).
The first prong of the effects doctrine, applied to the case at
hand, requires one to ask whether the intended effect of the
scheme (the reduction of carbon emissions) is substantial within
EU territory.9 9 While one could debate whether the actual ef-
fects of the scheme will have a substantial effect on the EU,
there can be little doubt that the intended effect of subjecting
non-EU airlines is substantial in the eyes of the EU. This is evi-
denced by the EU's participation as a party to the Kyoto Proto-
col (among other environmental initiatives) and the
96 Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Sec'y of State for Energy & Cli-
mate Change, 2 C.L.M.R. 4, 110, 121-130 (2012).
9 See id. 111; Mayer, supra note 7, at 1128.
98 See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 2 C.L.M.R. 4, 121-130. Examples of the Court
considering jurisdictional issues include: its assessment involving the "territorial
scope" of the Directive, its statement that the EU must respect international law
in the exercise of its powers, its discussion of the unlimited jurisdiction of the EU
when planes land at an airport in EU territory, and other considerations of terri-
toriality. Id.
99 See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402.
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establishment of the scheme in the first place."oo However, hav-
ing a generally intended substantial effect is not enough; there
must be an intended substantial effect within the territory of the
EU 0 1
This is an instance where the distinction between territorial
and extraterritorial emissions becomes important. The intended
substantial effects prong is clearly satisfied in terms of territorial
emissions, as the EU intends to effectuate a substantial decrease
of carbon emissions within its territorial airspace. This is not as
clear when looking to extraterritorial emissions: by reducing ex-
traterritorial emissions, is the EU intending to effectuate sub-
stantial effects within EU territory or within the global
environment as a whole? In the author's opinion, the most logi-
cal answer is that the EU's regulation of extraterritorial emis-
sions is intended to effectuate substantial effects on the global
climate, but not substantial effects within EU territory. However,
because the Court was reviewing Directive 2008/101 under a
manifest error standard of review1 2 and because the EU holds
itself out as an aggressive protector of the environment,1 0 3 this
prong of the effects doctrine could reasonably be held to have
been satisfied in Air Transport as to both types of emissions; but
under a less deferential standard of review, this would not be the
case. 0 4
The fatal prong of the effects doctrine for the scope of Direc-
tive 2008/101 is the second prong: the exercise of jurisdiction
by the state must be reasonable."0 ' The EU's exercise ofjurisdic-
tion over emissions that occur outside EU territory is manifest
error because it unreasonably purports to regulate highly indi-
rect, extraterritorial conduct that is not sufficiently territorially
100 See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12; Air Transp. Ass'n ofAm., 2 C.L.M.R. 4,
11 26-40.
101 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATEs § 402.
102 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 2 C.L.M.R. 4, 1 110.
103 See, e.g., id. 1 128 (stating that "European Union policy on the environment
seeks to ensure a high level of protection").
104 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402. Again, the first prong allows the intentions of the regulating party
to stand in for the actual effects of such exercise of jurisdiction; combining the
aggressive intentions of the EU relating to environmental protection and the
highly deferential standard of review, one would be hard-pressed to say Directive
2008/101's regulation of extraterritorial emissions violated this prong. See id.
10 Id. § 403.
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linked to the EU. Such a conclusion is reached by analyzing the
various factors provided by Restatement § 403.106
The first general factor to consider in analyzing the reasona-
bleness of Directive 2008/101 is whether there is a sufficient ter-
ritorial linkage to subject non-EU airlines to the scheme; in
other words, this analysis must consider "the extent to which the
activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory."'0 7 By the ex-
press language of this factor, the territorial emissions have suffi-
cient territorial linkage because the emissions take place within
EU territory. 0 But this is not the case for extraterritorial emis-
sions. Sufficient territorial linkage would require the extraterri-
torial emissions to have a direct effect upon the territory of the
EU.'09 Here, however, the effects of extraterritorial emissions
are indirect, at best. For example, emissions occurring while a
plane is flying over New York will affect the quality of the air in
and around New York. The potential indirect effect such emis-
sions will have upon the EU requires a long chain of speculative
events: the carbon emissions gather over the New York area,
which causes a small, local increase in temperature, which
causes a minute increase in temperatures worldwide (over an
extended period of time) by way of a slow dispersement of heat
throughout the world. The effects such emissions have on the
EU are the same effects they have on China or Canada: highly
indirect.
In addition, the territorial linkage stemming from non-EU
planes landing in the EU, which the Court claims is sufficient
territorial linkage, 10 is only sufficient for territorial emissions.
Non-EU planes that land in the EU must fly a portion of their
route over EU airspace, which provides a direct territorial
linkage. However, before a plane enters EU airspace, its emis-
sions are not directly affecting the EU and cannot be justified by
the mere fact that the plane eventually lands in the EU. There-
fore, the extraterritorial emissions do not have a sufficient link
to the EU to fulfill the territorial linkage factor of the reasona-
bleness prong. The territorial emissions do, however, have a suf-
ficient territorial link.
106 See id. § 403(2)-(3).
107 See id. § 403(2) (a) (emphasis added).
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Sec'y of State for Energy &
Climate Change, 2 C.L.M.R. 4, 1 125 (2012).
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The second general factor to consider in analyzing the rea-
sonableness of Directive 2008/101 is the importance of the
scheme to the EU.11' As discussed earlier, the EU places a high
priority on environmental protection, which is evidenced by
agreements to which the EU is a party, such as the Kyoto Proto-
col, 112 and by simply looking to various statements by the Court
in Air Transport.118 In fact, "the EU has often taken the lead in
global efforts to mitigate climate change.""' Therefore, this sec-
ond factor weighs in favor of the scheme as to both territorial
and extraterritorial emissions.
The third general factor to consider in analyzing the reasona-
bleness of Directive 2008/101 is a broad concern of comity that
looks to both other nations' perceptions of the scheme and the
potential for conflict of laws." As evidenced in Part IV, this fac-
tor swings very heavily against the scheme."' The governments
of at least twenty-eight countries protested the inclusion of non-
EU aircraft in the scheme."' Many countries threatened retalia-
tory measures, and some non-EU airlines have refused to com-
ply with procedures required under the scheme."1 s Additionally,
the United States has even passed bills in the House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate that shield U.S. airlines from complying
with the scheme, setting up a stark conflict of laws between the
United States and the EU. '
Two of the three general reasonableness factors under Restate-
ment § 403 weigh very heavily in favor of finding the scheme un-
reasonable. However, the territorial link factor only weighs
against the reasonableness of the extraterritorial emissions.
Therefore, in Air Transport, the Court should have invalidated
the scheme under the effects doctrine as to extraterritorial emis-
sions as unreasonable, but should have validated the scheme as
to territorial emissions as reasonable. In other words, the Court
of Justice should have limited the scope of Directive 2008/101
I" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§403(2) (c), (e).
12 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 12.
113 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 2 C.L.M.R. 4, 1 128 (" [EU] policy on the environ-
ment seeks to ensure a high level of protection.").
114 Mayer, supra note 7, at 1115.
15 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(2) (c), (e)-(h), (3).
116 See supra Part IV.
117 Mayer, supra note 7, at 1113-14.
118 Id.; Volcovici, supra note 3.
119 Volcovici, supra note 3.
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to subjecting non-EU aircraft to liability under the scheme only
for territorial emissions-not extraterritorial emissions. A pro-
posed formula for calculating this is contained in Appendix A.
VI. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the Chicago Convention, the Kyoto Protocol,
the Open Skies Agreement, the EU's carbon emissions trading
scheme, and Directive 2008/101, the EU considers the reduc-
tion of greenhouse gases a priority-regulating carbon emis-
sions by the airline industry plays a large role in that reduction.
But no matter how important reducing carbon emissions is to
the EU, that interest does not confer the right to impose regula-
tions that surpass the limits of the EU's jurisdiction. Air Transport
put the EU's controversial inclusion of extraterritorial emissions
emitted by EU and non-EU airlines alike in its carbon emissions
trading scheme in the hands of the Court. Unfortunately, the
Court failed to appropriately analyze whether the subjection of
non-EU aircraft to liability for extraterritorial emissions satisfies
jurisdictional customary international law.
The intensity of the scheme should have been limited to the
legitimate reach of EU jurisdiction. A thorough analysis of Di-
rective 2008/101 in light of the effects doctrine shows that Di-
rective 2008/101, as interpreted in Air Transport, is overly broad
and excessive in its extraterritorial effects. While the Court's
judgment in Air Transport is not wholly incorrect, a more appro-
priate judgment from the Court would have limited the scope of
non-EU airline liability to emissions that occurred within the ter-
ritorial airspace of the EU. 1 2 0
The international reaction to Directive 2008/101 and the
Court's Air Transport decision has been general uproar and dis-
dain for such a unilateral imposition of a carton emissions trad-
ing scheme upon non-EU airlines. The backlash was so intense
that some anticipated a possible trade war between the EU and
many of the world's economic powers, including the United
States, Russia, Japan, China, and India. 1 2 1 The ICAO opposed
Directive 2008/101, and the United States even passed a biparti-
san law prohibiting U.S. airlines from complying with the EU's
carbon emissions trading scheme.
Wisely, the EU suspended the application of the scheme to
flights into and out of the EU until the ICAO has a chance to
120 See infra Appendix A.
121 Alcock & Lowe, supra note 63.
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negotiate an international, multilateral deal that provides an al-
ternative to the EU's current carbon emissions trading scheme.
Because the suspension will be lifted if the ICAO fails to negoti-
ate a viable alternative, the pressure is now on the ICAO to
reach a multilateral agreement. If such an agreement is reached
and replaces Directive 2008/101, the Court's problematic deci-
sion in Air Transport will be neutralized. But if the ICAO fails to
reach such an agreement, the Air Transport decision will-in the
EU's eyes-continue to authorize its application of the scheme
to all emissions occurring during the entirety of any flight that
lands in or departs from an EU Member State.
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APPENDIX A
EU Territorial Airspace
Distance flown in EU airspace: 200 km
Total Distance: 1,000 km
Current Emission Formula (for one-way flight):
* Emission quantity = fuel consumption x emissions factor
o Where "fuel consumption" = amount of fuel contained
in aircraft tanks once fuel uplift for the flight is com-
plete - amount of fuel contained in aircraft tanks once
fuel uplift for subsequent flight is complete.
Proposed Emission Formula (for one-way flight):
* Emission quantity = fuel consumption x emissions factor
o Where "fuel consumption" = (amount of fuel con-
tained in aircraft tanks once fuel uplift for the flight is
complete - amount of fuel contained in aircraft tanks
once fuel uplift for subsequent flight is complete) x
proportion of flight occurring in EU territorial
airspace.
* Where "proportion of flight occurring in EU terri-
torial airspace" = distance flown in EU territorial
airspace + total distance of flight.
Example calculation of "proportion of flight occurring in EU
territorial airspace" value, based on above diagram:
* 200 km - 1,000 km = 0.2
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